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Introduction

Employees and their families are increasingly responsible for securing their own nancial
well-being. Prior to the 1980s, U.S. workers relied mainly on Social Security and employer
sponsored dened benet (DB) pension plans for their retirement security. Today, by contrast, Baby Boomers are increasingly relying on dened contribution (DC) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) to nance their golden years.

The transition to a

DC retirement saving model has the advantage of permitting more worker exibility and
labor mobility than in the past, yet it imposes a greater responsibility on individuals to
save, invest, and decumulate their retirement wealth sensibly. At the same time, nancial
markets have become more complex, oering products that are often dicult to understand.
Whether individualsin particular, older individualsare equipped to deal with this new
nancial landscape is an important question that has implications for families, society, and
policy makers.
Traditional economic models of saving and consumption decisions implicitly assume that
people are able to formulate and execute saving and decumulation plans, all of which require
expertise in dealing with nancial markets, and that they have the capacity to undertake
complex economic calculations.

Yet, as Lusardi and Mitchell have reported (2008, 2009,

2011a,b), few people possess the nancial knowledge adequate to make and execute complex
nancial plans.

Moreover, acquiring such knowledge is likely to come at a cost.

Previ-

ously we built and calibrated a stochastic life cycle model featuring uncertainty in income,
longevity, capital market returns, and medical expenditures; that study also incorporated an
endogenous knowledge accumulation process and a sophisticated saving technology (Lusardi,
Michaud and Mitchell 2017). In the model, nancial knowledge provided consumers with
access to sophisticated nancial products that boosted their expected return on nancial
assets.

Naturally, those seeking to transfer resources over time by saving beneted most

from nancial knowledge.
The contribution of the present paper is to show how our stochastic life cycle model
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incorporating endogenous human capital acquisition may be used to help evaluate nancial
literacy programs. Specically, since knowledge is at the core of the model, the approach
permits us to evaluate how nancial education policies can inuence saving and investment
decisions.

Several prior studies have sought to measure how nancial training programs

changes behavior, but few have the kind of experimental data to capture precisely what the
impact of the interventions actually is. Using our model, we evaluate the eectiveness of
eorts to build workplace nancial education using econometric methods commonly used
to estimate the eect of such programs. Inasmuch as all counterfactuals are known in the
context of our model, this allows us to compare true outcomes with estimates commonly
generated by conventional program evaluation techniques.

We show that it is frequently

optimal for individuals to fail to invest in knowledge, as it is expensive to acquire and will
not benet everyone.

Nevertheless, providing employees with nancial knowledge can be

valuable, depending on when it is oered and what reinforcement is provided. To this end,
we use conventional program evaluation econometric techniques and simulated data to take
into account selection and treatment eects: this allows us to measure how such programs
shape wealth accumulation, nancial knowledge, and participation in sophisticated assets
(e.g. stocks) across heterogeneous consumers. Relatively more eective programs are those
which embed follow-up or are continued over time, so as to help employees retain knowledge
acquired via the program. In this case, nancial education delivered to employees around
the age of 40 will optimally enhance savings at retirement by close to 10%. By contrast,
programs that provide one-time education can generate short-term but few long-term eects.
Finally, we evaluate how important it is to account for selection in program participation. We
conclude that comparing participants and non participants, even in a dierence-in-dierence
framework, can deliver misleading estimates of program eectiveness.
The paper has several parts. First, we briey summarize prior studies, and next, we describe our model and outline our calibration approach. We then present a series of scenarios
where we evaluate the simulated impacts of alternative nancial education programs.

In

turn, we use the resulting datasets to examine various econometric models conventionally
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used to evaluate such programs. The paper concludes with a short discussion of the insights
that policy and the nance and pension industry can gain from this work.

2

Prior Literature

In the wake of the nancial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, interest has burgeoned in
programs seeking to enhance nancial literacy. For instance, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published a long list of reports on the importance of nancial literacy and nancial education programs.

Several education programs

in the U.S. focus on educational interventions for young people before they enter the labor
market (Mandell, 2008; Walstad, Rebeck and MacDonald. 2010; Richardson and Seligman,
2014), while others examine programs oered to working-age adults, often by employers who
seek to enhance employees' appreciation of and investment in their workplace-based nancial
literacy education (e.g., Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Clark, d'Ambrosio, McDermed, and
Sawant 2006; Lusardi, Keller, and Keller, 2008; Clark, Morrill, and Allen 2012).
Despite the widespread popularity of such programs in the U.S. and elsewhere, our
recent literature review (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) as well as Collins and O'Rourke (2010)
argued that relatively little could be learned from most of the existing evaluations to date.
This is because analysts have typically not followed the protocol required by 'gold standard'
randomized controlled trials, enabling researchers to extrapolate from observed results. More
specically, a good evaluation will compare outcomes for a randomly selected `treatment'
versus 'control' group, where the former will be exposed to a well-dened nancial literacy
program, while the latter will not (Imbens and Woolridge, 2009; Imbens, 2010).

To this

end, the modern program evaluation literature has identied three commonly used metrics
for such comparisons:

an Intent to Treat (ITT) measure, an Average Treatment Eect

on the Treated (ATET) measure, and a Local Average Treatment (LATE) measure. In our
context, the ITT compares outcomes of those who were versus were not oered the program,
irrespective of whether and which people actually elected the program when oered. The
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ATET measures the eect for the treated, not the average eect of moving someone into
treatment, and hence it is often the only way to estimate program eects when selection
is present; that is, one may not be able to evaluate a program's average treatment eect

1 Finally, the

when those who do participate endogenously dier from those who do not.

LATE measure, as dened by Angrist and Imbens (1994), captures the eect of the program
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for those who would participate in the program only if it was oered. . Randomization of
eligibility is a key ingredient for the recovery of LATE by instrumental variables regression.
In the context of nancial education programs, some authors seeking to evaluate the
impact of the programs have estimated ITT eects by comparing outcomes for people who
were and were not exposed to the programs, given the option to undertake education programs. Good examples include studies of programs mandating high school nancial literacy
programs at dierent times across states (c.f., Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki 2001; Bayer,
Bernheim and Sholz 2009). Yet other researchers have estimated the eect of participating
in a program which may include both treatment and selection eects; numerous examples
are cited in Lusardi and Mitchell (2014).

And nally, several researchers have sought to

estimate program eectiveness using instrumental variables estimation, seeking to control
on potential unobserved factors driving program participation and thus recover the LATE
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).

Our general conclusion, however, is that much remains to

be learned about how nancial education aects key outcomes of interest. Without a welldened control group selected via randomized assignment, it is typically dicult to measure
the eect of nancial education programs, since assumptions needed to estimate what program adopters would have done in the absence of the program (the counterfactual) are
probably too strong.
To remedy this problem, we show below how we can use our model (LMM forthcoming)
to help clarify what can happen when a nancial education program evaluation lacks a
guiding theoretical framework.

Most importantly, given individual heterogeneity and the

1
In some cases, however, if a proper counterfactual can be identied, the average treatment eect can be
estimated.
2
In a randomized control trial with one-sided non-compliance (individuals not assigned to treatment
cannot receive it), the LATE estimate may coincide with the ATET eect.
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costs and benets of nancial literacy, not everyone will gain from nancial education.
Accordingly, one should not expect a 100% participation rate in every nancial education
program. Moreover, according to our model, nancial education programs may not always
boost savings, and in fact they may not increase savings at all for some.

Therefore it

is inaccurate to conclude that lack of saving means that nancial education is ineective.
Instead, lack of saving can actually be optimal behavior for some, and nancial education
would not be expected to change that behavior. In this respect, our framework helps explain
who is likely to participate in such programs, what behavioral outcomes can result, and
whether lack of impact is proof of program ineectiveness.

3

The Model and Calibration

3.1 Model
In what follows, we focus on workplace nancial education programs of the sort most often
oered by employers with dened contribution pensions.

3 We consider employees who can

elect to take advantage of such programs, which for the present purposes can be conceptualized as nancial education of one year's duration, delivered to employees who have not
previously anticipated getting the oer.
We characterize each program in terms of three key parameters: an eligibility rule, a
program cost, and the program's eectiveness. We assume eligibility is assigned randomly
to all employees of a given age, which we vary across experimental settings (more on this
below).

The impact of the nancial education program is to reduce the employee's cost

of investing in knowledge. When a program is of high quality, it provides an incentive to
acquire more knowledge, and individual employees will then decide whether to participate
in the program. Costs matter as well: for instance, if the program were free, all workers
will participate (or at best they will be indierent). In order to capture the time/money
costs of participating in the program, we model the participation cost for the program as a

3
See for instance, Bernheim and Garrett (2003); Bayer, Bernheim, and Sholz (2009); Clark, d'Ambrosio,
McDermed, and Sawant (2006), and Clark, Morrill, and Allen (2014).
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xed variable; a more general framework could depend on income or education, but for the
present purposes we keep it xed.
The remainder of the model follows our prior work (LMM forthcoming). Each individual
is posited to select his consumption stream by maximizing expected discounted utility, where
utility ows are discounted by
and dened as

nt u(ct =nt ),

. Utility is assumed to be strictly concave in consumption

where

nt

is an equivalence scale capturing (known) dierences

in consumption patterns across demographic groups (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun,
hereafter SSK 2006). Each person's faces a stochastic mortality risk (in addition to income
and medical expenditure risk), and decisions are made from time t=0 (age 25) to age T (or as
long as the individual is still alive; T=100 ). We examine people of three dierent education
proles (High School dropouts or <HS; High school graduates or HS; and those with at
least some college, whom we call the College+). It is important to allow for heterogeneity
in earnings because dierent groups receive dierent rewards from the progressive social
insurance system, as described in LMM (forthcoming), and they face dierential patterns of
income, mortality, demographics, and out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk.
We also posit that the individual can invest his resources using two dierent investment
technologies.

One is a basic technology (for example, a checking account) which yields

a certain (low) return

r (R

= 1+r

).

This represents the expected return to consumers

without any nancial know-how. The other is a more sophisticated technology which enables
the consumer to receive a higher expected return which increases in nancial knowledge
but comes at a cost.
technology,

cd ,

f

Specically, the consumer must pay a direct cost (fee) to use the

and he must also invest time and money in acquiring the knowledge to

i

generate a suciently high excess return. Obtaining knowledge in the form of investment t
thus has a cost of

i (it ); we assume that this cost function is convex, reecting decreasing

returns in the production of knowledge.

We remain agnostic about whether the average

cost of investing in additional knowledge is higher or lower for more educated households;
rather, we assume initially that all households face the same cost function.

The rate of

return to the sophisticated technology is stochastic, with an expected return that depends

7

t Re(ft+1 ).

on the individual's level of nancial knowledge at the end of ,
return function is log-normally distributed with

log Re(ft+1) = r + r(ft) + ""t
"t
r(ft+1 )

the standard deviation of a normally distributed shock
in

Thus the stochastic

. The function

ft+1 and it can be interpreted as an excess return function.

where

"

is

is increasing

Since the variance is assumed

xed, this also implies that individuals with higher nancial knowledge obtain a higher
Sharpe ratio (higher risk-adjusted returns) on their investments.

We denote by

t

fraction of wealth that the consumer invests in the sophisticated technology in period

the

t.

Financial knowledge evolves according to the following equation:

ft+1 = (1 )ft + it
where



is a depreciation rate and

it

is gross investment. Depreciation exists both because

consumer nancial knowledge may decay, and also because some knowledge may become
obsolete as new nancial products are developed. Alternatively, nancial education can be
modeled as a permanent boost to knowledge if the depreciation rate were to become smaller
or even zero.
The consumer is also eligible for a government transfer
consumption oor of

trt which guarantees a minimum

cmin (as in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, hereafter HSZ; 1995).

This

consumption oor can lower the expected variance of future consumption, which diminishes
the precautionary motive for saving. Transfers are dened as

trt = max(cmin xt ; 0) where

cash on hand is:

xt = at + yt oopt
where

yt

is net household income and

oopt

represents out-of-pocket medical expenditures.

Both variables are stochastic over and above a deterministic trend. The sophisticated technology cannot be purchased if

xt cd < cmin (that is, the government will not pay for costs
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of obtaining the technology). End-of-period assets are given by:

at+1 = Re (ft+1 )(xt + trt ct (it ) cd I (t > 0))
where

Re (ft+1 )

such that assets

= (1

t )R + t Re(ft ).

We impose a borrowing constraint on the model

at+1 must be non-negative.

Following the literature, the individual's net income (in logs) during his worklife is given
by a deterministic component which depends on education, age, and an AR(1) stochastic
process; retirement occurs at age

65

. After retirement, the individual receives retirement

income which is a function of pre-retirement income and a similar stochastic AR(1) process

4

is assumed for post-retirement out-of-pocket medical expenditures. . Finally, we allow for
mortality risk at all ages, denoting

pe;t

as the one-year survival probability. Mortality risk

is allowed to dier across education groups, as in LMM (forthcoming).
The state-space in period

t is dened as st

= (y;t; o;t; e; ft; at)

where

y;t

and

shocks to income and medical spending. The consumer's decisions are given by

o;t

are

(ct; it; t)

.

Accordingly, there are three continuous control variables, consumption, investment, and the
share of investment in the technology, and a discrete one, participation. There are ve state
variables. We represent the problem as a series of Bellman equations such that, at each age,
the value function has the following form:

V (st ) =

max ne;tu(ct=ne;t) +

ct ;it ;t

pe;t

  
" y

o

V (st+1 )dFe (o )dFe (y )dF (")

at+1 = Re (ft+1 )(at + ye;t + trt ct (it ) cd I (t > 0)); at+1  0
ft+1 = (1 )ft + it
Re (ft+1 ) = (1 t )R + t Re(ft ):
We index variables by

e where education dierences are assumed to be present.

4

The model

Because these expenditures are generally low prior to retirement (and to save on computation time), we
allow only for medical expenditure risk after retirement (as in HSZ 1995)

9

is solved by backward recursion after discretizing the continuous state variables.

5

3.2 Calibration
To explore the impact of nancial education on employee behavior, we assume that
has a CRRA form with relative risk aversion



u(ct =nt )

for calibration purposes. Here we assume

 = 1:6, close to the value estimated by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999) using
consumption data. Following SSK (2006), we dene an equivalence scale that accounts for
consumption dierences in household size by education group and changes in demographics
over the life cycle. Assuming that
in the household and

k

z (j; k) = (j + 0:7k)0:75

where

j

is the number of adults

ne;t

is the number of children under age 18, we then dene

z (je;t ; ke;t )=z (2; 1) where je;t

and

ke;t

=

are the average number of adults and children in the

household by age and education group. We use data from the PSID to estimate the time
series of average equivalence scales by education group. The age prole of those scales is
hump-shaped and more amplied for less-educated households. For the base case, we use
a discount factor of 0.96 (as in SSK, 2006, and Campbell and Viceira 2002). The annual
minimum consumption oor is set at $10,000 for a couple with one child.
Post-retirement income is dened to be a function of pre-retirement income, estimated
from xed-eect regressions analyzed separately by education level of net household income
on age and a retirement dummy, as in LMM (forthcoming). This produces replacement rates
of 0.75 for high school dropouts, 0.74 for high school graduates, and 0.63 for the College+,
close to those based on total retirement income in the literature (e.g. Aon Consulting, 2008).
Following retirement, we let income decline at the rate estimated in PSID data controlling
for educational groups and cohort eects; that pattern is mostly due to changes in household
composition (e.g. widowhood).
Turning to the nancial market variables, we posit a safe asset return of
in Campbell and Viceira 2002).

r

=

2% (as

As the excess return function has not been previously

established, we note that the range of risk-adjusted excess portfolio returns reported by von

5

For additional details on the solution method see LMM (forthcoming).
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Gaudecker (2011), for example, is -0.017 (5th percentile) to 0.054 (95th percentile). Using
Euler equations, Jappelli and Padula (2013) estimate that each point of nancial literacy is
associated with an expected increase in the return to saving from 0.2 to 1 percent. Clark,
Lusardi and Mitchell (forthcoming) use administrative data on 401(k) participants and nd
that there is about a one percentage point dierence in returns between those who have the
lowest nancial literacy score and those that have the highest.
function by setting

We therefore use a linear

rmax = r(fmax ) = 0:04 and rmin = r(fmin ) = 0 where 0.04 is chosen to

match the equity premium used in the portfolio literature. Below, we choose a convex cost
function for investing in nancial knowledge, which therefore embodies decreasing returns to
producing knowledge. We set

" = 0:16 in the simulations (Campbell and Viceira, 2002).6

Estimating the price of acquiring nancial knowledge is dicult, as little is known regarding inputs to the production process (time and expenditures on nancial services), along
with investments in, as opposed to, the stock of nancial knowledge. As in LMM (forthcoming), we model the process using the function

(it ) = 50i1t :75

, a form that posits that the

rst units of knowledge are inexpensive, while marginal costs rise thereafter. To parametrize

c

the participation cost for the sophisticated technology ( d ), we use the median estimate of
$750 (in $2004), following Vissing-Jorgensen (2003).
depreciation factor for nancial knowledge,

We also require an estimate of the

, though little is known on the size of this pa-

rameter. We use a value of 6 percent in our baseline calibration which is consistent with
estimates of the depreciation of human capital.
Given this calibration, we can nd optimal consumption, nancial knowledge investment,
and technology participation at each point in the state-space and at each age. Having done
so, we then use our decision rules to simulate 2,500 individuals moving through their life
cycles. We draw income, out-of-pocket medical expenditure, and rate of return shocks, and
we use these to simulate the life cycle paths of all consumers. These consumers are given the
initial conditions for education, earnings, and assets derived from the PSID for individuals
age 25-30. We initialize nancial knowledge at the lowest level (0). A list of the baseline

6

For information on how we estimate income and medical expenditure processes as well as mortality risk
by education, see LMM (forthcoming).
11

parameters and their values is provided in the Appendix.

4

Simulating the Impact of Financial Education Programs

4.1 The Programs
Given the model described above and the parameters of interest, we can evaluate the impact of employer-provided nancial education programs on a variety of outcomes, including
whether and which employees elect to participate, how much they invest in nancial knowledge, their use of the sophisticated technology to invest, and how their lifetime consumption
and utility levels change. We let eligibility for a particular nancial education program offered in a given year be expressed using a binary variable

dit , and in what follows we assume

eligibility is assigned randomly to all employees of that given age (which we vary across experimental settings). We model the nancial education program as reducing the employee's
cost of investing in knowledge. We expressed

p (it )

= #(it)

, where

#<

1

captures the

eciency of the program. If the program is high quality, it provides an incentive to acquire
more knowledge and more employees will then decide to participate in the program. Costs
matter as well. For instance, if the program were free, all workers will participate (or be
indierent). In order to capture the xed time and perhaps money costs of participating in
the program, we dene

as the participation cost for the program.

If the employee is eligible for a program, we dene

Vp (st ) (p = 0; 1) as the value (indirect

utility) of not participating versus participating, respectively. The individual participates
if

v(st )

= V1(st)

dierence,

V0 (st )

it  N (0; v ).

is greater than zero.

We add a zero mean disturbance to this

Hence, participation is given by:

pit = I (v(st ) + it > 0)
In order for

it to have the correct scale, we x v to the standard deviation of the simulated

utility dierences (0.001).
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The simulations to follow explore a number of dierent programs. First, program eligibility is a function of age, so we evaluate how results change depending on whether the
program is provided to employees at age 30, 40, or 50. When a worker is of the targeted
age, he is deemed to be eligible with probability 0.5. We also explore how program eectiveness aects outcomes, by varying
participating (i.e.,

# 2 [0:1; 0:5].

Additionally, we vary the xed cost of

2 [250; 500]). And in a nal and very important case, we also allow for

the program to aect knowledge depreciation. That is, we posit that the nancial education
program provides knowledge that does not depreciate over time. This last experiment captures the possibility that a program could provide employees with nancial advisers who can
be accessed over time or that the program is continued over time. A total of six illustrative
scenarios is considered below.

4.2 Who Participates in Financial Education Programs?
To understand who participates and who does not in a workplace nancial education program
of the sort described here, we rst explore employees' participation patterns across various
scenarios.

Table 1 reports how participation rates in the program vary given (randomly

assigned) employee eligibility, where it is clear that participation rates overall (last column)
are generally below 100 percent. We emphasize that this is not a sign of program failure;
rather, people must incur a cost when investing in knowledge, and knowledge depreciates
with time. For both reasons, not everyone will partake of the opportunity to build knowledge.
It is also worth noting that program participation rates rise depending when (at which age)
program is oered. This is to be expected, since people tend to save most between the ages
of 40 and 60; employees have little money to manage earlier in life. Furthermore, we nd
that program participation is higher for the better-educated, due to the larger gain from
investing in knowledge for those individuals. Conversely, the least-educated are less likely
to partake of the program oering. As we showed in LMM (forthcoming), the uneducated
optimally save less, both as a result of their greater reliance on the social safety net, and their
shorter life expectancies. The nal two rows of the table indicate how participation rates
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for a program oered at a given age, say age 40, vary depending on two factors: program
eciency, and the cost of participation. Logically enough, more ecient programs attract
higher participation, whereas higher costs reduce participation.
[Insert Table 1]
In Table 2, we summarize the baseline characteristics of those who elect to participate in
a nancial education program when oered, versus those who do not (conditional on being
eligible at a given age). Results indicate that program participants have higher earnings,
more initial knowledge, and more wealth, while nonparticipants are poorer, earn less, and
have little nancial knowledge at baseline. This selectiveness occurs regardless of the age
at which the program is oered. Importantly, it implies that an average program eectiveness measure which assumes that program and nonparticipants could benet as much as
participants will likely be biased.
[Insert Table 2]
The fact that those who optimally elect to undertake the nancial education program
dier systematically from those who do not underscores the fact that a careful program
evaluation must take into account the process by which people endogenously elect into the
program.

That is, it would be misleading to compare outcomes for program participants

versus nonparticipants, since each group has dierent reasons for their behavior. Moreover,
any evaluation program that cannot carefully control the sample's baseline characteristics
will be subject to such selection bias. Of course some of these characteristics  e.g., nancial
knowledge  may be dicult to measure precisely.

Nevertheless, unless randomization is

available, modeling the selection process is critical.

4.3 The Eect of Financial Education Programs over the Life Cycle
A useful aspect of our simulation approach is that the same simulated respondents are
observed in dierent experimental settings, as they are, in turn, oered dierent nancial
education programs. Accordingly, we may compare life cycle investment, wealth, and saving
proles for the same individuals, along with information about whether they did or did not
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optimally take part in each program.
Figures 1 to 6 report results, under six dierent nancial education settings, of average
proles of investment in knowledge, stock of knowledge, changes in wealth (in percent), and
the share of wealth invested in the sophisticated technology. Specically, gures 1-3 analyze
how results change when the program is oered to a worker at age 30, 40, or 50. Figure 4
reports results for a program oered to a 40-year old employee with an enhanced eciency
parameter, and in Figure 5 we lower the xed cost of knowledge (shown in the same order
as in Tables 1 and 2).

Figure 6 illustrates how results change when nancial knowledge

depreciation is shut down, as for instance when an employer may maintain the employee's
nancial sophistication post-program via continued monitoring.
[Insert Figures 1 to 6]
A comparison of the rst three Figures shows how results change when we vary the age
at which the program is implemented. In each case, the upper left-hand panel depicts the
impact on investment in nancial knowledge, while the impact of the program on the stock
of nancial knowledge appears in the upper right-hand panel. In the lower left, we report
the percentage change in wealth, and on the lower right, the share of the population using
the sophisticated investment technology. Each panel includes three lines: the solid line refers
to non-enrolled but eligible participants; the dashed line refers to enrolled participants; and
the dotted line indicates how participants would have behaved without the program being
introduced  a true counterfactual for those who did enroll when they could.
Figure 1 shows what happens with the program is made available to age 30 employees.
Those who participate in the program do invest substantially in nancial knowledge; this
translates into a higher stock of nancial knowledge compared to their own (no-program)
counterfactual.

We also see that those who participate in the program cut back on their

investment after the program expires. Along with depreciation in nancial knowledge, this
leads to a dampening of the program's eect when it is over. Nevertheless, after the initial
ramp-up in nancial knowledge, the marginal eect on behavior compared to the proper
counterfactual is quite small. Conversely, we see that those who do invest in the nancial
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knowledge program are markedly dierent from those who do not.

In other words, both

nancial knowledge and sophisticated investment proles are much higher compared to employees who optimally elect not to participate, underscoring the sample selection concern
made earlier.

In fact, if one were to compare program participants and nonparticipants,

one would (erroneously) conclude that the program had an enormous impact on the stock
of nancial knowledge, producing a 20 percentage point advantage for participants.

Yet

the true counterfactual shows that the net eect of a one-year program oered at age 30 is
quite small, particularly by the time the worker attains age 65. Results are similar across
Figures 1-3, though when the program is implemented on older versus younger workers, the
consequences appear slightly larger.
Somewhat larger program eects are evident in Figures 4 and 5.

When the program

oered becomes more ecacious for a 40-year old employee (Figures 2 versus 4), the employee
experiences a much larger bump-up in knowledge which persists for some time, and savings
rise detectably. Similar results obtain when the cost of knowledge is reduced (Figure 2 versus
5). Here again, investment in knowledge rises and some persistence in higher savings can be
detected.
A much larger and longer-term impact results from shutting down the knowledge depreciation parameter, conrmed by a comparison of Figures 2 and 6. The 40-year old employee
oered access to a nancial education program whose eects do not decay will average three
times more investment in knowledge, which in turn boosts his saving substantially.

This

eect persists until retirement, underscoring the long-term eect of not only building the
knowledge, but also extending it throughout time. In other words, a one-time nancial education program may have title eect, as expected, but the long term eects of a persistent
nancial education program can be sizable.

16

5

Evaluating Financial Education Programs

Next we use our simulated data to investigate the eect of the programs of interest using
the dierent metrics employed in the nancial education literature, as described above. We
also evaluate program eectiveness on welfare, measured by changes in lifetime consumption
and utility.

5.1 Long-Term Eects
Frequently, empirical researchers may not know when individuals in any given survey may
have been exposed to or oered some sort of programs. In the present case, for instance, an
employee may not recall whether his employer ever oered a nancial education program and
if so, when. Nevertheless, in some cases the econometrician may be able to observe wealth at
some particular age (e.g., retirement), accompanied with an indicator of whether the person
had ever been exposed to such a program earlier in life.

7 This can allow a determination of

how oering an educational program aects outcomes of interest. In other cases, one might
know which employees elected to take a program, permitting a comparison of outcomes
between those who participated and those who did not. Rarely are both available, in practice,
and the dierent outcomes are not directly comparable unless, as shown above, strong
assumptions hold about the selection process into the program.
Results in Table 3 illustrate how results dier in our simulated setting where we can
measure each of the key employee subgroups.

For the six scenarios described earlier, we

present four columns of retirement wealth values.

The rst column summarizes wealth

levels for participants who elected to take the program when oered. The second column
reports counterfactual wealth for the same people if the program had never been oered.
The third column shows wealth levels for nonparticipants  those oered but who declined
to participate  and the nal column summarizes average wealth for those never oered
the program. As before, each row represents a dierent policy experiment, with a program

7
For instance the Health and Retirement Study has asked older individuals if their employers had oered
them workplace-based nancial education programs (Lusardi, 2004).
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oered at age 30, 40, or 50 (rst three rows), or at age 40 and three sets of other parameters
comparable with those developed in Figures 1-5.
[Insert Table 3]
Turning to the rst row of that Table, program participants held mean wealth at retirement of $524,271. Had they not participated in the program, the same people's mean wealth
would have been about 1% lower (and the dierence is statistically insignicant). This is
the properly measured program eect on those who participated, consistent with Figure 1.
In other words, the program did boost both nancial knowledge and wealth at the time the
employees were oered the program, but by retirement, the eect virtually disappeared.
In the real world, of course, we typically cannot observe the ideal counterfactual; instead,
we must nd ways to identify a counterfactual and therefore the average eect of the program
on the treated. If one could reasonably assume that program participation were independent
of wealth, then nonparticipants could be used to measure the counterfactual: the estimated
program eect would be to raise retirement wealth by 75% ($225,292/$298,979).
These numbers would lead one to conclude that the program was extremely eective in
boosting saving; however, as demonstrated earlier, this is a severely upward-biased metric
because participation is correlated with wealth at baseline. Alternatively, we could investigate the eect of oering the program without conditioning on those who participated.
Since program eligibility is random in our simulation, everyone who was eligible to elect the
program comprises the ITT group. From Table 1, we know that 36% of those oered the
program participated, which when combined with data in Table 3, yields an average wealth
level of $381,480 for the eligible, versus $392,069 among the ineligible. Surprisingly, then,
by this metric, oering the program decreases average retirement wealth by a statistically
insignicant3% (-$10,589/$381,480).
We can do better by recalling that program eligibility is random in our scenarios. Accordingly, we can recover the eect of the program on participants by comparing program
participants and non participants. To do so, Imbens and Angris (1994) suggest using the
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Wald estimator:

 = E [wEi;[65p jjddi == 1]1]
i

where

wi;65

is wealth of respondent

The expectation operator is

E []

E [wi;65 jdi = 0]
E [pi jdi = 0]

i

i at age 65, di

denotes eligibility, and

pi

participation.

. Under certain assumptions, Imbens and Angrist (1994)

show that this Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE) eectively captures the eect for
a group of individuals who comply with the treatment being oered.
cannot participate,

E [pi jdi

eect becomes:

Since the ineligible

= 0] = 0

, we have one-sided non-compliance and therefore the

 = E [wi;65jdi E=[p1]jd E=[w1]i;65jdi = 0] :
i

i

This delivers the average eect of the program on the treated, or the ATET (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). For the rst scenario in Table 3, this yields a statistically insignicant change
(-$10,589/0.36 = -$29,414), or a 7.4% drop, in percentage terms.
Continuing down the rows in Table 3, it is interesting to note that the largest bias
generated by comparing participants and nonparticipants occurs when the program is oered
to employees at age 40.

At earlier ages, selection is less strong since participants and

nonparticipants are more similar and wealth is lower.

Later in life, however, the saving

motive switches from precautionary to retirement preparation, and behavioral dierences are
exacerbated. After age 50, these dierences again diminish. Since most nancial education
in the workplace occurs mid-career (around the age of 40), our model suggest that selection
can be a major threat to the evaluation of such programs.
It is also of interest that the largest eects occur for most ecient programs provided at
low cost. For example, the next to nal row in Table 3 (where

# = 0:25; and

= 250)

shows

that the true program eect slightly boosts retirement wealth by 1.3% ($6,491/ $472381
which is statistically insignicant).

Comparing the ineligible with the eligible groups, we

see an apparent negative impact of oering the program (by 3.1%, or -$12,361/395314).
The Wald estimator of the eect for those who comply with the oer of the program yields
an estimated 4.9 % eect of (-$19684/ $395314 and not statistically signicant).
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In fact,

the only statistically signicant eect across all program scenarios evaluated is found in the
nal row of Table 3, where depreciation has been shut down. This program does increase
retirement wealth substantially, by 9% (($467371 - $428874)/$428874), yet that is much
smaller than the 1.5 times wealth increment that would result from (incorrectly) using the
nonparticipant pool as the comparator group.
To rene these estimates, next we implement these identication strategies in a regression
framework which allows us to control for observable dierences in outcomes.

5.1.1 Intent-to-Treat
As noted above, the intent-to-treat measure in our setting compares outcomes of those who
were program-eligible to those who were not, assuming that program eligibility is exogenous
to outcomes. To test this with our simulated data, we implement the following regression
which controls for education and average lifetime income:

log wi;65 = xi + 4di + i:
Under random assignment, we have

i ?di .

Table 4 reports for each of our six scenarios the point estimate of
standard error.

4 along with its

In ve of the six cases, the program eects are small and statistically

insignicant, ranging from -0.06 to 0.1236. This conrms the unconditional levels estimates
we reported in Table 3. By contrast, the program eect is positive and statistically signicant
for the nal experiment, where nancial knowledge is preserved through time. The estimate
suggest an eect of 30% with a standard error of 12%. Controlling for covariates yields an
even larger ITT estimate.
[Insert Table 4]
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5.1.2 OLS on Program Participation
Thus far, we have argued that, due to selection bias, comparisons of participants and nonparticipants do not identify the eect of the program on outcomes. But one might wonder
whether this could be remedied by controlling for factors observed sometimes early in life,
say at age 25. Since nancial knowledge is zero at age 25, there are two exogenous outcomes
on which we could condition: wealth at age 25, and average lifetime income (in addition to
the education dummies). To evaluate this, we run the following OLS regression:

log wi;65 = xi + 4pi + i
This delivers the average eect of the program on the treated, if
the new point estimates of

4 along with their standard errors.

i ?pi jxi .

Table 5 reports

Results in Table 5 show that when a nancial education program is oered early in
life, such as at age 30, baseline controls can suciently correct for selection, since estimated
eects are close to zero. After that, however, the controls and functional form are insucient
to control for biases imparted by endogenous selection. In other words, the estimated eect
of participating in the program becomes large and statistically signicant when the program
is oered to older workers. This is mainly due to the fact that incentives to save and, thus,
acquire knowledge are a function of the income, rather than simply its level.
[Insert Table 5]

5.1.3 Local Average Treatment Eects
The Wald estimator can also be implemented as an instrumental variables (IV) regression
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In our case, the rst-stage regression for participation is:

pi = xi
assuming that eligibility is independent of

+ di + i
i .

Results are reported in Table 6 along with

standard errors. Our ndings conrm that programs which do not aect depreciation have
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little eect on retirement-age wealth levels. Although the point estimates are generally positive, the standard errors are often large. Only in the nal scenario where the average eect
on the treated (true) is positive does the LATE estimator pick up the eect and does the
estimate become statistically signicant. Accordingly, this IV estimator is a proper estimator of the average treatment eect on the treated (ATET) when eligibility or assignment to
treatment is random.
[Insert Table 6]

5.2 Contemporaneous Eects
Several evaluations of nancial education programs compare the same individuals prior to
and after receiving the training.

When the same is done for a control group, one can

implement a dierence-in-dierence (DD) strategy of the following form:

log wit = i + t + 4zit + xit + it
for

= (pit; dit)

zit

. Identication of the average eect requires that

it ?zit jxit ; t ; i .

The

common-trend assumption imposes that, in the absence of the program, the average change

z

in wealth of those who participate ( it

z

participating ( it
either

pit

or

dit .

= 0):

= 1)

would have been the same as for those not

We can estimate this equation using xed-eect regression using

As described above, estimates of

4 capture both the ATET and the ITT

eects.
To implement this approach in our simulated data, we consider two periods: one year
prior to the program, and ve years after the program. Since we can directly compute the
average eect of the program on those who participated (using the true counterfactual),
we also report this estimate in column 4 of Table 7.

We nd that the true eect of the

program on those who participate is generally small, except when the program is highly
eective. Using non participants as the counterfactual (hence implementing DD with

pit )

yields generally large and positive eects. The key explanation for why these estimates are
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biased is that the common-trend assumption in fact does not hold for participants and non
participants.

That is, participants in nancial education programs in our scenario would

save more in the absence of the programs, compared to non participants. For this reason,
using the trend on wealth of nonparticipants as a counterfactual grossly overestimates the
eect of the programs.

Implementing DD with eligibility yields relatively smaller biases,

compared to using participation.
[Insert Table 7]

6

Discussion and Conclusions

In previous research we have demonstrated that important segments of the population are
nancially unsophisticated and do not understand simple interest, ination, and risk diversication (Lusardi and Mitchell 2008, 2011a,b). We have also shown that it is actually
optimal for many people to be unsophisticated, in that some people will rationally elect not
to invest in knowledge as it is expensive to acquire and does not benet everyone (LMM
forthcoming). The present paper goes farther by using our theoretical model to evaluate the
impacts of well-specied nancial education programs that could be oered by employers to
workers of dierent ages. In particular, we use our stochastic life cycle model incorporating endogenous knowledge accumulation to evaluate six dierent nancial literacy program
scenarios. This is useful since no empirical studies have the kind of information needed to
capture precisely what the impact of the interventions will be.

In our case, we know all

relevant counterfactuals to compare true outcomes with program eectiveness estimates
generated by conventional econometric techniques.
Our approach provides several important insights regarding nancial education program
evaluation. First, we show that low participation rates in such programs can be rational,
once we recognize that improving nancial literacy does not benet everyone and acquiring
knowledge is costly. In particular, the low-income and less-educated have less to gain from
participating in such programs.

For this reason, it is incorrect to conclude that nancial
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education programs are not valued and preach only to the converted. Rather, the decision
to invest in nancial education depends on its costs and benets, factors which dier across
individuals. Second, our model emphasizes the role of self-selection in nancial education,
particularly at older ages.

Accordingly, great care is required to rigorously evaluate the

eectiveness of nancial education in non-experimental settings, where self-selection tends
to occur. Third, prior studies have taken too narrow a focus by overlooking the crucial role
of knowledge retention, once the nancial education is obtained. That is, nancial education
delivered to employees around the age of 40 can raise savings at retirement by close to 10%,
if the knowledge gained can be maintained.

Fourth, and relatedly, we show that short-

term nancial education programs are unlikely to dramatically alter saving, especially when
oered to young people. They are more eective when targeted at peak saving years (e.g.,
post-age 40).
A nal important lesson from our work is to point out how measures of nancial education
program eectiveness shape outcomes across heterogeneous individuals so that evaluators
build several key elements into the study design.

First, it is essential to have accurate

measures are of what information the program delivers and what sort of follow-up is provided. Second, the researcher must measure baseline features of the eligible sample including
wealth, income, and nancial literacy. Third, it is necessary to randomize eligibility for the
treatment. And fourth, longer-term follow-up is crucial.
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Figure 1:

Eects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: Inter# = 0:5 and = 500.We plot the average age prole of investment in

vention at age 30 with

knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age prole had they not participated in the program.
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Figure 2:
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in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age prole had they not participated in the program.
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the age prole had they not participated in the program.
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Eects of the Financial Education Programs over the Life-Cycle: Intervention at age 40 with # = 0:25 and
= 500.We plot the average age prole of investment
Figure 4:

in knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age prole had they not participated in the program.
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Eects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: Intervention at age 40 with # = 0:25 and
= 250. We plot the average age prole of investment
Figure 5:

in knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age prole had they not participated in the program.
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Figure 6:

Eects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: In# = 0:1 and = 100 and no depreciation of knowledge among

tervention at age 40 with

participants to the program. We plot the average age prole of investment in knowledge,
stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot the age
prole had they not participated in the program.
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Table 1:

age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

less HS

HS

college

total

500

.2349

.3302

.4453

.3662

500

.3571

.4428

.5287

.4677

.5

500

.3438

.5109

.5792

.517

40

.25

500

.4048

.5084

.6169

.5405

40

.25

250

.4762

.6004

.6877

.6206

40

.1

100

.6131

.7899

.8429

.7882

Program Participation:

We report participation rates to the program among

those eligible for a series of scenarios and for three education levels. Age refers to the time at
which the program is implemented,
in the program, and

# is the relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge

is the xed cost of participating in the program.
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age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

income (np)

n (np)

wealth (np)

income (p)

n (p)

500

34182

2.577

18742

55559

12.67

52396

500

39939

13.86

35747

69325

43.46

111863

.5

500

49104

36.79

143971

66180

61.48

189600

40

.25

500

36277

10.31

27705

68482

42.49

108452

40

.25

250

36171

10.04

29141

64388

38.5

97148

40

.1

100

32171

9.837

34501

59463

32.5

81246

Table 2:

Characteristics of Participants and non participants:

wealth (p)

We report means of

baseline characteristics (income, nancial knowledge, and wealth) for participants (p) and
non participants (np). Age refers to the time at which the program is implemented,
relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge in the program, and
participating in the program.

35

# is the

is the xed cost of

age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

participants

counterfactual

non-participant

non-eligible

500

524271

522186

298979

392069

500

519852

517146

253147

395314

.5

500

442676

440577

312325

394461

40

.25

500

515385

508452

220050

395314

40

.25

250

478872

472381

221023

395314

40

.1

100

467371

428874

187233

395314

Table 3:

Wealth at Retirement by Groups:

We report mean wealth at retirement (age

65) for those who participate in the program, mean wealth for those who participate had
they not participated (counterfactual), non participants among those eligible and nally
those not eligible.

Age refers to the time at which the program is implemented,

relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge in the program and
participating in the program.
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#

is the

is the xed cost of

age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

ITT

se

500

.1141

.1129

500

.1081

.1128

.5

500

-.02788

.113

40

.25

500

.1223

.1127

40

.25

250

.1236

.1127

40

.1

100

.2907

.1116

Eect of Oering Financial Education Program on Wealth at Retirement
(Intent-to-Treat): We report for each program the intent-to-treat estimate of the program
Table 4:

along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by regressing log wealth at retirement
on eligibility to the program and controls for education and average lifetime income.
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age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

OLS

se

500

-.005068

.1512

500

.4073

.1367

.5

500

.672

.13

40

.25

500

.5023

.1302

40

.25

250

.4428

.1241

40

.1

100

.7365

.1146

Table 5: Eect of Financial Education Program Participation on Wealth at Retirement (OLS): We report for each program the estimate of the eect of the program
along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by regressing log wealth at retirement
on participation to the program and controls for education, average lifetime income and
initial wealth (at age 25).
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age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

LATE

se

500

.3102

.3069

500

.2259

.235

.5

500

-.05387

.2183

40

.25

500

.2207

.2028

40

.25

250

.1964

.1786

40

.1

100

.3669

.1399

Table 6: Eect of Financial Education Program Participation on Wealth at Retirement (LATE-IV): We report for each program the estimate of the local average treatment eect along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by instrumental variables
regression of log wealth at retirement on participation to the program and controls for education and average lifetime income. The instrumental variable is eligibility to the program.
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Table 7:

Wealth:

age

#

30

.5

40

.5

50

counterfactual

non-participant

non-eligible

500

-.01929

.7243

.4537

500

.005797

.304

.1558

.5

500

.003612

-.01652

.009615

40

.25

500

.02136

.394

.1825

40

.25

250

.04464

.288

.1265

40

.1

100

.1142

.4037

.17

Dierence-in-Dierence Eect of Financial Education Program on
We report estimates of the eect of the nancial education program on wealth

(in percent) 5 years after the program, relative to one year prior to the program. This is
done using 3 potential counterfactuals. The rst uses outcomes of those treated had they
not participated (average eect on the treated). The second and third columns use dierent
counterfactuals. The second uses non participants (but eligible). The last column uses those
not eligible.
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Appendix

Parameter



Value
1.6

r
r(fmax )
0
1
cd

cmin

0.96
0.02
0.04
50
1.75
750
0.06
10,000

Baseline Parameter Values. Baseline values are as follows: relative risk
 = 1:6), nancial knowledge depreciation rate ( = 0:06), investment production
1:75 ), participation cost (cd = 750), discount factor ( = 0:96). The cost
function ( (i) = 50i

of investing in knowledge takes the form  (i) = 0 i 1 . See text.
Table A.1:
aversion (
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